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1. INTRODUCTION
Historically the licensing of press ownership has been a sensitive
issue' and the ownership of broadcast stations by newspapers has
been an especially volatile one in recent years. Although restrictions
on the freedom of the press are often viewed with hostility by the
American public, the duties imposed upon the Federal Communica-
tions Commission require it to implement some restrictions on that
freedom. This year the Commission issued a new rule changing
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1. The licensing of press ownership has long been a troublesome issue in Eng-
land. Indeed, John Milton, in a famous essay, denounced parliamentary abuses
and overrestrictiveness in licensing procedures. J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644).
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licensing procedures regarding cross-ownership of broadcast sta-
tions by newspapers. 2
The early history of the broadcast industry in this country and its
unique nature have provided the justification for licensing regula-
tion. In summarizing broadcasting's unique nature, Professor Glen
0. Robinson has characterized the broadcast industry as a highly
influential media utilizing publicly owned airwaves to which access
is technologically limited.3 Because there are a limited number of
available channels and because it is in the public interest that they
be put to their fullest and most effective use,4 the control of a broad-
cast channel is considered a "pilvilege" held in trust for the public:'
These considerations are the basis for the Commission's power to
impose regulations on the broadcast industry which no government
agency could impose on the print media.6
2. Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, 50
F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975) (Second Report and Order) [hereinafter cited as Multiple
Ownership].
3. See Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years
of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 151 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Robinson].
Four arguments have traditionally been presented io describe the perceived
unique nature of the broadcast industry: First, unlike other communications
media, the means of broadcast communications are publicly owned. They are part
of the "public domain" administered in trust for the public by the Commission.
Second, the use of the airwaves is a privilege, not a vested right. The broadcasters
receive their privilege only so long as they serve the public interest. Third,
electronic media are uniquely influential. The public impact of electronic media,
especially television, is so great as to warrant special attention. Finally, there are
a finite number of channels, thereby limiting access to the airwaves. Id.
4. FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING (1941):
With the number of radio channels limited by natural factors, the public
interest demands that those who are entrusted with the available channels
shall make the fullest and most effective use of them.
Id. at 81.
5. See Robinson, supra note 3, at 151.
6. The principle that the federal government may not interfere with the content
of printed media has been limited only in cases of pornography, sedition, and libel.
See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (pornography); Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919) (sedition). Traditionally, government interference with the press has been
considered inconsistent with first amendment policy. Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). This concept was recently reaffirmed
in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The Supreme
Court held that a Florida statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (Supp. 1974), which
required newspapers attacking the personal character of a political candidate or
[Vol. 24:1217
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In spite of the justifications for some limited regulation of the
broadcast media, the actions taken by the Commission have contin-
ually evoked controversy. 7 In recent years a particularly disputed
issue has been ownership of broadcast stations by newspapers. The
controversy generated by this issue resulted in the Commission's
opening of Docket 18110 in 1968 with the intent of using the docket
as a vehicle for the establishment of clearer standards and proce-
dures for reviewing multiple ownership. During this proceeding, the
Commission received various opinions through written comments
and hearings. It used the information in an attempt to develop a
coherent policy consistent with the first amendment principles re-
garding freedom of the press. The docket culminated in the issuance
of the Commission's order on January 31, 1975.
In order to understand the issues raised by Docket 18110 it is first
necessary to understand the often competing first amendment prin-
ciples with which the Commission must deal, the early history of the
broadcasting industry, and the Commission's prior attempts to deal
with the problems of cross-ownership. After discussing these areas,
this article will go on to analyze the various positions taken by
contributors to Docket 18110 and to critique the position ultimately
taken by the Commission in its order of January 31.
A. Principles of Restraint
Congress created the Federal Communications Commission when
it passed the Communications Act of 1934.8 This Act imposed a duty
on the Commission to protect the public interest by providing for
the rapid and efficient utilization of wire and radio communications
nationally and around the world? This public interest standard
nominee to afford an equivalent amount of free space to that candidate for reply,
was unconstitutional. In his concurring opinion, Justice White said, "Liberty of the
press is in peril as soon as the government tries to compel what is going into a
newspaper." 418 U.S. 241, 261 (1974) (White, J., concurring). See also 2 Z. CHAF-
FEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 633 (1947).
7. For examples of how cross-membership has evoked litigation in the past see
notes 55-68 & accompanying text infra. The controversy surrounding cross-
ownership policies was largely responsible for the opening of Docket 18110 in 1968.
See notes 89-90 & accompanying text infra.
8. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
9. Virtually all the Commission's determinations are explicitly directed to be in
the public interest. See, e.g., id. §§ 201(a) (orders common carriers to furnish
service), 309(a) (considerations in evaluating license applications), 319(c) (license
issuance). Similarly, the courts have consistently viewed the Commission's man-
1975)
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contemplated fostering first amendment policies, a task which puts
the Commission in the position of having to balance two often com-
peting goals of the first amendment. The first of these two goals is
that the government should exercise restraint in imposing any re-
strictions on freedom of the press.'0 It is well settled that the first
amendment provides substantial protection for the broadcast media
from governmental interference." This protection springs from the
proposition that any governmental interference with the broadcast-
ing industry constitutes a restraint on free speech and freedom of
the press, and "any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justi-
fied by clear public interest .. "1..,2 In spite of its recognition that
the broadcast media was so protected, Congress determined that
some limited form of government supervision was required. This
determination resulted in the enactment of the Radio Act of 1927's
and the Communications Act of 1934." That these provisions for
regulation of the broadcast media were justified by clear public
interest is obvious from a cursory glance at the early history of the
date as one of protecting the public interest. See, e.g., FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329
U.S. 223 (1946); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942).
10. See, e.g., American Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 374
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 284 (1954) ("Broadcasting and television are enti-
tled to the protection of the First Amendment . . . .") 110 F. Supp. at 389. Cf.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) (motion pic-
tures protected by first amendment in same manner as radio and newspapers).
11. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
Since it is clear that the first amendment protects the broadcast media, United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), the government gener-
ally may not censor or limit the content of editorial broadcasts and news reports.
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). However, some govern-
ment control of broadcast content exists, specifically in the application of the equal
time and fairness rules. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1964). These regulations ensure equal
treatment of all candidates for a particular elective office. In theory, anyone who
desires to disseminate an idea in print can do so. However, this is; not true in the
electronic media. With a finite amount of "air time" and a limited number of
broadcast frequencies, access to the broadcast media is tightly controlled. In order
to promote first amendment idea diversity, the Commission has promulgated its
regulations concerning equal time and fairness. Columbia Broadcasting Co. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-14. See, e.g., Fairness Doctrine, 2 P
& F RADIo REG. 2d 1901, 1904 (1964); Barron, The Federal Communications Com-
mission's Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1961). While
this is not content control per se, the equal time and fairness rules suggest an
exception to the limitations on governmental interference.
12. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
13. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, §§ 1-3, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
14. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
[Vol. 24:1217
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radio industry in this country.
Prior to the Radio Act of 1927, new radio stations were free to
operate on any frequency without regard to existing stations or the
public interest. 5 Often several stations operated on a single broad-
cast frequency, thereby causing the airwaves to become so cluttered
with various signals that no information reached the public. This
chaotic situation necessitated the coordination and optimum utili-
zation of available frequencies and facilities, and, when it enacted
the Radio Act of 1927, "Congress acted upon the knowledge that if
the potentialities of radio were not to be wasted, regulation was
essential."'" As the communications media developed, however, it
became apparent that it would be necessary for the Commission to
protect and promote a second goal of the first amendment. This
second goal of freedom of the press is that the press should present
diverse viewpoints. 7
B. Principles of Diversity
It was recognized by Thomas Jefferson that a free society needed
not only freedom of the press'8 but a press that presented varied
viewpoints. 9 Jefferson believed that a democratic electorate must
be well informed in order to make intelligent and rational decisions.
The first amendment embodies the theory that the best vehicle for
the edification of the people is a free press through which diverse
views emanate."
In his famous analysis of American government, Alexis de
Tocqueville drew a sharp distinction between the effect of America's
free press and that of France's government-controlled press. He
stated, "Freedom of the press is the guarantee of liberty; the sover-
eignty of the people presumes every citizen has powers of discrimi-
nation between various opinions and drawing inferences there-
15. See J. HERRING & G. CEROSS, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, ECONOMICS AND
REGULATION 239-86 (1936) (history of federal regulations of radio communication).
See also L. WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO 126-54 (1947).
16. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
17. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
18. Letters from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787, July 31,
1788, in THE LIFE AND SELcrED WRMNGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 436, 450 (A. Koch
& W. Peden eds. 1944) [hereinafter cited as Koch].
19. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Dufief, April 19, 1814, in KOCH,
supra note 18, at 635.
20. For evidence that this view persists to this day see note 37 infra.
19751
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from." 2' De Tocqueville recognized that the essential aspect of a free
press which makes democracy work is the dissemination of a variety
of opinions and ideas.22 Justice Holmes reiterated this concept in
Abrams v. United States:23
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe. . . that the ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas,-that the best test of truth
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.Y
From this it is clear that concomitant with freedom from govern-
mental interference, people of different views must be assured ac-
cess to the press. Without this assurance, the press can be domi-
nated by a few, thereby weakening democracy and promoting oligar-
chy. Judge Learned Hand articulated the need for wide access to the
press in United States v. Associated Press25 wherein he argued that
"the dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with
as many different facets and colors as is possible" is "one of the most
vital of all of our general interests. '21 He went on to state:
That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the
interest protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.2
In this case, Learned Hand was faced not with governmental sup-
pression of news, but with a large private concern arbitrarily using
its power to restrict the flow of news to the public. 28
Early statesmen and scholars, like Jefferson and de Tocqueville,
recognized the possibility of governmental suppression of diverse
views, but they probably did not contemplate the advent of the
21. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, AMERIcAN INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR INFLUENCE 181-82
(1851).
22. Id.
23. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (distribution of seditious
pamphlets during war with Germany not protected by the first amendment).
24. Id. at 630.
25. 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (cooperative news
association bylaws restricting the distribution of news reports violative of Sherman
Antitrust Act).
26. Id. at 372.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 368-70.
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electronic media or undue private control of the media. When Jef-
ferson and de Tocqueville lived, access to printing facilities was
widespread and inexpensive. Today, acquiring and starting a broad-
cast facility is a multi-million dollar undertaking. Technological
complexities also limit entry into the electronic media market. The
Federal Communications Commission was thrust into this industry
while it was in its infancy and has had the difficult task of balancing
the two first amendment goals as it has monitored and regulated the
industry through its maturation. A primary means of fulfilling its
statutory duties has been through the use of its licensing power.
HI. COMMISSION LIcENSING POLICIES REGARDING DIVERSITY
PRIOR TO RULING IN DOCKET No. 18110
When Congress created the Federal Communications Commis-
sion in 1934 to regulate "interstate and foreign commerce in com-
munication by wire and radio,"2 9 it delegated broad and general
powers to the Commission without providing more guidance than
that the Commission act in the "public convenience, interest, or
necessity."3 These broad powers were granted in order to provide
the Commission with the flexibility necessary to cope with the com-
plex and evolving field of telecommunications and broadcasting.31
A. The Issuance of New Licenses
Almost from its inception, the broadcasting industry has moved
29. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
30. Id. § 303. See also id. §§ 201(a), 309(a). Amendments to the Act continued
to emphasize that the Commission's determinations were to be guided only by the
"public interest" standard. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 319(c), 360(b) (1970). The courts
have consistently viewed the mandate of the Commission as one of protecting the
public interest. See, e.g., Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942);
WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 109 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172-78
(1968) (Commission has authority under the Communications Act to regulate
newly-developed community antenna television systems); National Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) ("Congress was acting in a field of
regulation which was both new and dynamic. . . . In the context of the developing
problems to which it was directed, the Act gave the Commission not niggardly but
expansive powers"); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940)
("Underlying the whole law is recognition of the rapidly fluctuating factors charac-
teristic of the evolution of broadcasting"); American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191
F.2d 492, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ("The purpose of Congress in establishing the Com-
mission was to set up an expert agency capable of coping with the ever-changing
and constantly-increasing problems of a booming industry").
1975]
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toward concentrated ownership.2 When television entered the
broadcasting field, newspaper owners had the expertise, the re-
sources, and the economic interest to establish stations and there-
fore were among the first to receive licenses.3 Recognizing the po-
tential for consolidation of the media industry, 3' the Commission
passed rules regulating the issuance of licenses where multiple own-
ership was involved .3 Although broadcasters are subject to antitrust
litigation,36 the multiple ownership rules did not contemplate an
32. See FCC REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 5 (1941). Less than three years after
the first broadcasting station was established, the first broadcast network was
formed. Id.
33. 32 CONG. Q. 660-61 (Mar. 16, 1974).
34. Id. at 661.
35. Multiple ownership may be defined as ownership of more than one broadcast
facility-standard broadcast stations, frequency modulated (FM) stations, VHF or
UHF television stations-by the same individual or company. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.35(a) (1974).
The Commission's regulations do not focus rigidly on the issue of ownership.
Rather, they concentrate on ownership, operation, or control, direct or indirect. For
example, Notes 1 and 2 to § 73.35 treat ownership of voting stock as a factor to be
considered, but define "control" as "not limited to majority stock ownership, but
includ[ing] actual working control in whatever manner exercised."
The Supreme Court upheld this exercise of the Commission's powers in United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Corp., 351 U.S. 192 (1956):
This Commission, like other agencies, deals with the public interest ...
Its authority covers new and rapidly developing fields. Congress sought to
create regulation for public protection with careful provision to assure fair
opportunity for open competition in the use of broadcasting facilities. Ac-
cordingly, we cannot interpret [the Act] as barring rules that declare or
present intent to limit the number of stations consistent with a permissible
"concentration of control."
. . . We think the Multiple Ownership Rules, as adopted, are reconcilable
with the Communications Act as a whole.
Id. at 203-04 (citation omitted).
36. In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), the Supreme Court
recognized that the commercial control and selective distribution of news reports
by a major cooperative news service violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The
basis of the Court's holding was that the Associated Press was ultimately depriving
the public of information from diverse sources by excluding certain newspapers
from receiving its news service reports. Writing for the majority, Justice Black
stated that the first amendment rested
on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that
a free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that the
government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford
nongovernmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that
[Vol. 24:1217
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antitrust analysis; antitrust actions are solely within the purview of
the Justice Department. 37 The Commission, however, has focused
on the license applicant's market control, in terms of amorphous
public interest policies, in establishing specific multiple ownership
rules.38
The first half of the multiple ownership rules is designated the "7-
7-7 Rule. ' 39 This rule prohibits ownership of more than seven AM,4"
seven FM,4' or seven television stations4 2 as a per se "concentration
constitutionally guaranteed freedom.
Id. at 20.
From this it is clear that implicit in the policy behind the first amendment is the
desire not merely for numerous voices, but for numerous voices espousing diverse
and even antagonistic ideas.
37. The Communications Act did not confer power on the Commission to resolve
antitrust questions. See United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334
(1959):
Thus, the legislative history of the Act reveals that the Commission was
not given the power to decide antitrust issues as such, and that the Commis-
sion action was not intended to prevent enforcement of the antitrust laws in
federal courts.
Id. at 346.
38. While the Commission cannot enforce the antitrust laws, see United States
v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 339-46 (1959) (legislative history of
Communications Act and authority of Commission reviewed), its administrative
regulations have reflected economic policy considerations, see Robinson, supra note
3, at 73. The courts have acknowledged that the potentially adverse effects of
concentrated media ownership are within the scope of Commission authority. For
example, the Supreme Court in National Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190 (1943), upheld the Commission's chain broadcasting regulations, 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.131-138 (AM) (1967). Chain broadcasting refers to the simultaneous
broadcasting of an identical program by two or more connected stations. The
purpose of these regulations was to restrict exclusive dealing practices between
networks and their affiliate stations and to prevent undue concentration of control
by networks over local or regional stations. The regulations in effect restrained
economic competition. Similarly, the Court in United States v. Storer Broadcast-
ing Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), upheld the Commission's rules concerning multiple
ownership. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35 (AM), 73.240 (FM), 73.636 (TV) (1967). These regu-
lations placed a maximum limit on common ownership of, interest in, or control
over, radio and television stations.
Cases such as these have left little doubt that economic concentration and owner-
ship diversity may be considered in Commission licensing. The rationale behind
the first amendment and the unique role of broadcasting make it clear that these
factors should be considered.
39. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(b), 73.240(a)(2), 73.636(a)(2) (1974).
40. Id. § 73.35(b).
41. Id. § 73.240(a)(2).
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of control contrary to the public interest. 4 3 If a party owns fewer
than seven of any one type of station and seeks an additional li-
cense, the Commission still may deny the license "if the grant of
such license would result in a concentration of control inconsistent
with public interest, convenience, or necessity."44
The second half of the multiple ownership rules is known as the
"duopoly rules."4 These rules prohibit the granting or renewing of
a license to any party that directly or indirectly owns, operates, or
controls one or more of the same type of broadcast station or a
television station in the same area. 6 The "same area" is defined by
the Commission as an overlap of ground wave contours." This prohi-
bition of airwave overlap results in an orderly distribution of a finite
number of frequencies, and is also intended to avoid a local concen-
tration of ownership inconsistent with "the public interest, conveni-
ence, or necessity."
The standard of "public interest, convenience, or necessity" has
never been and probably cannot be -defined concretely. The Com-
mission, supported by the courts, has applied this flexible standard
on an ad hoc basis and thus has evolved the skeletal guidelines of
its powers. In an early case, FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.4",
the Commission denied issuance of a radio license to Pottsville on
the basis of inadequate financial standing and insufficient local
interest. The Supreme Court, in upholding the Commission's ac-
tion, dissolved a writ of mandamus issued by the circuit court order-
ing the Commission to reconsider Pottsville's request for a license."
The Court held that the public interest standard must be suffi-
ciently flexible to allow the Commission to establish rules as the
broadcasting field evolves,5 and stated that "[i]nterference by the
42. Id. § 73.636(a)(2). No more than five television stations may be in the VHF
band. Id.
43. Id. §§ 73.35(b), 73.240(a)(2), 73.636(a)(2).
44. Id.
45. Id. §§ 73.35(a), 73.240(a)(1), 73.636(a)(1) (1974).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
49. 98 F. 288 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
50. As the Court put it:
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of this [growth of governmental
supervision over economic enterprise] has been the investiture of adminis-
trative agencies with power far exceeding and different from the conventional
judicial modes for adjusting conflicting claims-modes whereby interested
litigants define the scope of the inquiry and determine the data on which the
(Vol. 24:1217
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courts is not conducive to the development of habits of responsibil-
ity in administrative agencies."'"
In applying its rules regarding multiple ownership of radio sta-
tions, the Commission has enumerated several factors to be consid-
ered in determining whether concentration has reached a prohibi-
tive level: the size, extent, and location of areas served; the number
of people served; the classes of stations involved; and the extent of
other competitive service to the areas in question. 52 These considera-
tions exemplify the Commission's interpretation53 of its congres-
judicial judgment is ultimately based. Administrative agencies have power
themselves to initiate inquiry, or, when their authority is invoked, to control
the range of investigation in ascertaining what is to satisfy the requirements
of the public interest in relation to the needs of vast regions and sometimes
the whole nation in the enjoyment of facilities for transportation, communi-
cation and other essential public services.
309 U.S. at 142-43 (footnote omitted).
51. Id. at 146.
After this rebuke, the D.C. Circuit again tried to circumscribe the Commission's
powers in WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 153 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1946). The Commission had
refused to renew WOKO's license after learning that the beneficial owners of the
station had been concealed from it; the court reversed on the ground that the
misrepresentation of ownership did not warrant
the drastic decision that the continuance of the license would not be in the
public interest, with the concomitant results of disestablishing an established
and satisfactory radio station and of imposing upon its corporate owner the
entire loss of its good will and the serious impairment of the value of its
capital assets.
Id. at 633.
Once again the Supreme Court reversed:
We cannot say that the Commission is required as a matter of law to grant
a license on a deliberately false application. . . nor can we say that refusal
to renew the license is arbitrary and capricious under such circumstances. It
may very well be that this Station has established such a standard of public
service that the Commission would be justified in considering that its decep-
tion was not a matter that affected its qualifications to serve the public. But
it is the Commission, not the courts, which must be satisfied that the public
interest will be served by renewing the license. And the fact that we might
not have made the same determination on the same facts does not warrant a
substitution of judicial for administrative discretion since Congress has con-
fided the problem to the latter.
FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946) (emphasis added).
52. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(b), 73.240(a)(2), 73.636(a)(2) (1973).
53. See Newark Broadcasting Corp., 11 F.C.C. 1269 (1947). "Congress intended
. . . leaving it to the discretion of the Commission to achieve equality on a case-
to-case basis as a matter of its sound judgment and in the light of the relevant
factors." Id. at 1271 (footnote omitted).
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sional mandate to "provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribu-
tion of radio service to each of the [several states and communi-
ties]. 54 This policy is as broad as the public interest standard.
However, by enumerating local factors in its regulations, the Com-
mission has attempted to establish boundaries to the broad author-
ity delegated to it by Congress.
Local concentration has been an important consideration, but it
has not in itself always been dispositive. In FCC v. Allentown
Broadcasting Corp.,55 the Easton Publishing Company and the Al-
lentown Broadcasting Corporation, two companies located in differ-
ent cities, had applied for the same frequency. Both companies
could not operate on that frequency because "mutually destructive
interference" would result, nor would the station receiving the li-
cense be able to "render service to the other's community. '" The
hearing examiner awarded the license to the Allentown Broadcast-
ing Corporation, despite the fact that Allentown already had three
stations. The Commission reversed, finding that there was a greater
public need for additional television service in a community with
only one existing station than in one with three.57 The court of
appeals reversed and remanded the case to the Commission. One
ground for the remand was that the Commission's decision would
result in the acquisition of a concentration of control by the Easton
Publishing Company.-" Although Allentown had three stations, the
Easton Publishing Company controlled the local newspaper and
was the licensee of the only television station and one of the two FM
stations in Easton. The court of appeals held that this concentration
of control, as well as other factors, compelled it to find that the
record did not contain substantial evidence to support its finding
that "the ability of the applicants to serve their communities was
about equal."59 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
54. 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1970). See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470 (1940), wherein the Court stated that
the Act does not essay to regulate the business of the licensee. . . . [Tihe
broadcasting field is open to anyone, provided there be an available fre-
quency. . . if he shows his competency, the adequacy of his equipment, and
financial ability to make good use of the assigned channel.
Id. at 475.
55. 349 U.S. 358 (1955).
56. Id. at 359.
57. Id. at 359-60.
58. Allentown Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 222 F.2d 781, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
59. Id.
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clearly upholding the Commission's power to give more weight to
public need than to concentration of control."
B. Renewal of Existing Licenses
In 1969, the broadcast industry was shocked when the local con-
centration criterion, among others, resulted in the Commission's
denying renewal to incumbent licensee WHDH and granting the
license to a challenger contrary to the hearing examiner's recom-
mendations.6 The WHDH case represented the first time that a
renewal had been denied where the incumbent station's record was
"within the bounds of average performance. 6 2 Moreover, even in
cases of poor performance, only lighter sanctions, such as shorter or
conditional license terms, had been imposed in the past.63 In WHDH
the Commission held a comparative hearing and employed a bal-
ancing test pursuant to its Policy Statement on Comparative Broad-
cast Hearing64 examining the diversity of the applicant's ownership,
60. Fairness to communities is furthered by a recognition of local needs for
a community radio mouthpiece. The distribution of a second license to a
community in order to secure local competition for originating and broad-
casting programs of local interest appears to us to be likewise within the
allowable area of discretion.
349 U.S. at 362.
The Commission has delegated the authority to make initial license determinations
to an administrative law judge in some instances. These determinations are review-
able by a Review Board. The Commission itself acts as a final appeal board within
the administrative process. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.201-.204, 0.341-.365 (1974).
61. WHDH, Inc. 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), aff'd sub nom. Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
62. Id. at 10-11. See also Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d
1201, 1207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broad-
casting License Renewals, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Jaffe]. Cf. Goldin, "Spare the Golden Goose"--The Aftermath of WHDH in FCC
License Renewal Policy, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1014 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Gol-
din].
63. See Goldin, supra note 62, at 1021-23.
64. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Policy Statement]. While
the 1965 Policy Statement originally did "not attempt to deal with the somewhat
different problems raised where an applicant is contesting with a licensee seeking
renewal of license," id. at 393 n.1, the Commission had begun to apply its standards
to renewal proceedings in Seven (7) League Productions, Inc. (WIn), 1 F.C.C.2d
1597 (1965). The 1965 Policy Statement saw the comparative process as valuable
in fulfilling two related objectives:
[FJirst, the best practicable service to the public, and, second, a maximum
diffusion of control of the media of mass communications. The value of these
objectives is clear. Diversification of control is a public good in a free society,
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the integration of that ownership with the active management, and
its ascertainment and fulfillment of community needs."5 The Com-
mission thereupon decided to grant the license to Boston Broad-
caster, Inc. (BBI) upon finding that BBI's merits outweighed those
of WHDH and the other challengers."
In considering these several factors on a comparative basis in
WHDH, the Commission expressly departed from its previous prac-
tice, as stated in Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL),17 of evaluating only
the incumbent licensee's ascertainment and fulfillment record and
granting renewal if the record was meritorious. Such a departure
from previous policy aroused fears in licensees that they also would
be denied renewal for failing to meet the new amorphous standards
of public service. The Commission's reasoning in the WHDH case
and is additionally desirable where a government licensing 1system limits
access by the public to the use of radio and television facilities. Equally basic
is a broadcast service which meets the needs of the public in the area to be
served, both in terms of those general interests which all areas have in com-
mon and those special interests which areas do not share.
1 F.C.C.2d at 394 (footnote omitted).
65. Before reaching this stage, one challenger was disqualified for failing to meet
two requirements unrelated to the comparative issues. 16 F.C.C.2d at 6-7.
66. The Commission did not consider the past broadcast record of WHDH in the
comparative evaluation. 16 F.C.C.2d at 11. This was not done because the Commis-
sion found that the station's performance was "within the bounds of average per-
formance," id. at 10, and therefore, as the 1965 Policy Statement provided, pro-
perly excludable. Id. at 9. Rather, the Commission rested its decision on the facts
that granting the license to either challenger would greatly increase media diver-
sity, id. at 12-13; that both challengers had substantially greater integration of
ownership with management than did WHDH, id. at 13; and finally, that an
unauthorized transfer of control by WHDH, while not in itself dispositive, unfavor-
ably entered into the comparative evaluation, id. at 17-19.
67. 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951).
68. Excellent performance as a licensee will be given favorable considera-
tion where we find a reasonable likelihood that such performance will con-
tinue. . . . Moreover, in a comparative proceeding of the type before us, we
must give serious consideration to the high degree of probability of continua-
tion of existing desirable performance as against paper proposals which, on
the basis of the record before us, we are not convinced can be fulfilled.
Id. at 1175.
In comparison, in WHDH the Commission stated:
[A] past record within the bounds of average performance will be disre-
garded, since average future performance is expected . . . . Thus, while a
renewal applicant must literally run on his record and such record is the best
indication of its future performance, that record is meaningful in the compar-
ative context only if it exceeds the bounds of average performance.
16 F.C.C.2d at 9 (footnote omitted).
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was loudly criticized by the broadcasting industry as setting forth
general policy when the case was built on ex parte evidence and a
unique factual situation. 9
The industry applied pressure on the Commission and Congress
for a clarification of licensing policy and received an immediate
response. 0 In 1970 the Commission issued a policy statement on
comparative hearings involving incumbent renewal applicants
which returned to the Commission's previous practice as described
in Hearst.7 1 In it, the Commission pointed out two reasons for favor-
ing incumbents: first, if the licensee had been "substantially at-
tuned to meeting the needs and interests of its area, 7 2 it could point
to performance, whereas a challenger presented mere promises; and
second, the policy clarified the station's responsibilities-if the li-
censee showed substantial performance it could expect renewal,
thus contributing to predictability and stability in the industry
which was also in the public interest.7 3 The Commission defined
69. See Goldin, supra note 62, at 1015-17 n.12, suggesting that WHDH was not
a drastic departure from past Commission practices but rather a case which in-
volved special circumstances. Among these special circumstances were the pre-
vious misbehavior of WHDH's chief executive officer and an unauthorized transfer
of control. Id.
70. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Re-
newal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Policy
Statement]; S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
71. See 1970 Policy Statement, supra note 70.
72. Id. at 425.
73. The institution of a broadcast service requires a substantial investment,
particularly in television, and even where the investment is small it is likely
to be relatively large to the person making it. It would disserve the public
interest to reward good public service by a broadcaster by terminating the
authority to continue that service. If the license is given subject to with-
drawal despite a record of such good service, it will simply not be possible to
induce people to enter the field and render what has become a vital public
service. Indeed, rather than an incentive to qualified broadcasters to provide
good service, it would be an inducement to the opportunist who might seek
a license and then provide the barest minimum of service which would permit
short run maximization of profit, on the theory that the license might be
terminated whether he rendered a good service or not. The broadcast field
thus must have stability, not only for those who engage in it but, even more
important, from the standpoint of service to the public.
We believe that these two considerations call for the following pol-
icy-namely, that if the applicant for renewal of license shows in a hearing
with a competing applicant that its program service during the preceding
license term has been substantially attuned to meeting the needs and inter-
ests of its area, and that the operation of the station has not otherwise been
1975]
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"substantial" rather ambiguously as solid or strong ascertainment
and fulfillment of the community's needs throughout the license
period. 74 The Commission also found this policy fair to challengers
since it allowed them to judge their chances for successful chal-
lenges more realistically. 7
The 1970 Policy Statement, however, did not withstand court
challenge. The challenging applicants in Citizens Communications
Center v. FCC76 contended That the Commission exceeded its au-
thority by depriving them of a full hearing on their application in
violation of section 309(e) of the Communications Act of 1934. 7
Noting that the 1965 Policy Statement did not expressly apply to
renewal hearings, the court nevertheless cited with approval the
application of the various WHDH factors in the renewal hearing. 78
The court then held the 1970 Policy Statement to be an obvious
characterized by serious deficiencies, he will be preferred over the newcomer
and his application for renewal will be granted. His operation is not based
merely upon promises to serve solidly the public interest. He has done so.
Since the basic purpose of the act-substantial service to the public-is being
met, it follows that the considerations of predictability and stability, which
also contribute vitally to that basic purpose, call for renewal.
This is not new policy. It was largely formulated in the leading decision in
this field, Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951), where the
Commission, in favoring the existing licensee, stated that where a choice
must be made between an existing licensee and a newcomer, a grant will
normally be made to the existing station if its operation has been meritorious,
and that a good record may outweigh preferences to a newcomer on such
factors as local residence and integration of ownership and management. The
WBAL policy was followed in In re Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp., 35
F.C.C. 677 (1963), and cited with approval in recent actions ....
Id. (footnote & citation omitted).
74. Id. at 425 n.1, 426.
75. As the Commission interpreted the Statement:
The policy says to all interested persons, "The act seeks to promote not just
minimal service but solid, substantial service; if at renewal time, a group of
you believe that an applicant has not rendered such service, you may file a
competing application. .. ."
The policy is thus fair to the broadcaster and to the new contestant, and
above all it serves the listening and viewing public.
Id. at 428-29.
76. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
77. Id. at 1210-15, discussing Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327
(1945) (where two or more applications for permits or licenses are mutually exclu-
sive, one full comparative hearing must be conducted).
78. 447 F.2d 1212-13.
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contravention of the Communications Act in that it created a sum-
mary procedure which would deny the applicant a full hearing.79
In spite of WHDH and the court's holding in Citizens Communi-
cation Center v. FCC, it is clear that to a great extent Commission
policy has favored incumbent license holders in renewal proceed-
ings."0 Moreover, an amendment to the Communications Act,
section 310(b),8 ' precludes the Commission from holding compara-
tive hearings on whether the public interest, convenience, and ne-
cessity will be served when a license holder transfers, assigns, or in
any way disposes of the license to another party. This provision
effectively permits a license to be sold with routine approval; the
license subsequently will be renewed routinely with almost no eval-
uation of performance.2 Since 1960, only 21 challenges have been
made 3 to the over 900 television station licenses now held. 4 Of
these, one challenge and one renewal were granted, four challenges
were dismissed, and fifteen challenges are still pending.88 The dispo-
sitions of these challenges indicate why license holders are rarely
disenfranchised-the expense of a challenge is high8 and the proba-
bility of the challenge being successful is low.
C. The Need for Balancing
The historical tendency of the Commission to protect incumbent
license holders contrasts with its recognition of the problems inher-
ent in cross-ownership exemplified by the multiple ownership rules
regarding new licenses, and makes it clear that the Commission
79. Id. at 1211-12. "The proposition that the 1970 Policy Statement violates
Section 309(e) . . . is so obvious it need not be labored." Id. (footnote omitted).
80. See Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951):
So viewed it is manifest that the Commission can not disregard the record
of a licensee .... [W]e must give serious considerations to the high degree
of probability of continuation of existing desirable performance as against
paper proposals ....
Id. at 1175.
See generally Jaffe, supra note 62.
81. Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 8, 66 Stat. 716, amending 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)
(1970).
82. See Jaffe, supra note 62, at 1694.
83. Data as of March 31, 1973. See Hearings on H.R. 12993 Before The Sub-
comm. on Communications and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 860 (1974).
84. Id., pt. 1, at 314.
85. Id., pt. 2, at 680.
86. Id., pt. 1, at 163.
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must promulgate new rules regulating license renewal which more
effectively balance the competing desires for a minimum of govern-
mental interference and for an assurance that diverse views will be
represented. The problem with balancing these interests is potential
for governmental abuse in any ownership regulation. This is appar-
ent from the Commission's broad mandate to act in the public
interest 7 and the absence of any clear limit on its regulatory power."
The question of whether a pfoposed exercise of ownership control is
beyond constitutional limitations can be resolved only by balancing
the desire for diversity of ideas and the desire to avoid either undue
governmental interference or a precedent which might lead to it.
Commission regulations focus on diversity while attempting to
avoid regulation of content, although the fairness doctrine is in ef-
fect content regulation. In upholding the constitutionality of the
equal time and fairness rules in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,"
the Supreme Court was more concerned with the need for providing
access to persons with diverse views than with any desire to leave
the electronic media completely unregulated. Thus, some govern-
mental regulation of conduct and ownership of the electronic media
industry is constitutionally permissible. The question of permissi-
bility then becomes one of degree; both first amendment policies
must be considered to reach the desired balance. It was in the hope
of developing rules regulating the renewal of existing licenses that
would be more responsive to these considerations and that would
clarify past licensing procedures that the Commission opened
Docket 18110.
III. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED FOR DOCKET 18110
In 1968, after years of ambiguity in its license renewal policy, the
Commission announced its intent to establish clearer procedures
and standards for reviewing multiple ownership. The proceedings
which followed this announcement, Docket 18110, began on March
27, 1968, and terminated on January 28, 1975. Varied and distinct
opinions on first amendment principles as well as on economic
theory were presented to the Commission in the form of written
comments and hearings."
87. 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1970).
88. See Robinson, supra note 3.
89. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
90. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 33 Fed. Reg. 5315 (1968).
91. In its Order, the Commission noted the public's response:
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While all parties recognized that the twin policies of the first
amendment and the antitrust laws required diversity of views in the
media, they differed widely on the extent to which such diversity
presently existed and the extent to which the government should
attempt to promote further diversity.
The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and the Ameri-
can Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA), relying on the first
amendment, advocated a policy of restraint.9 2 The Department of
Justice, also relying on the first amendment (as well as antitrust
considerations), advanced a theory for virtually absolute
prohibition of cross-ownership.93 Other parties advanced a policy
which would balance the first amendment principles of restraint
and diversity, thereby emphasizing the Commission's concept of the
public interest as it relates to diversity policy.94
At one end of the spectrum, NAB and ANPA predictably argued
for a strict interpretation of the first amendment's prohibition of
governmental interference with the media.9" That the federal gov-
ernment may not interfere with the content of printed media has
been long established and strictly upheld, the most recent example
being Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.96 Asserting that
tampering with ownership may be tantamount to the tampering
with content forbidden by the first amendment,97 NAB and ANPA
As could be expected, our proposal generated a great deal of interest and
provoked a sizable number of filings. Most were directed to the question of
newspaper-broadcast ownership, with most parties opposing rule changes but
a number supporting them. Some approached the issues from the point of
view of anti-trust economic analysis; others stressed the diversity of view-
point aspect.
Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1047-48. Close to 200 parties
filed Comments and Reply Comments in response to The Further Notice of Pro-
posed Rule-Making in Docket 18110, 22 F.C.C.2d 339 (1970). See Multiple
Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1090-92 (App. A.). Several petitions for
review have been consolidated in National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting
v. FCC, Case No. 1064, petition for review filed, (D.C. Cir., Jan. 28, 1975),
amended, Jan. 31, 1975.
92. See notes 91-101 & accompanying text infra.
93. See notes 102-15 & accompanying text infra.
94. See notes 116-21 & accompanying text infra.
95. See, e.g., Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1050, 1071.
96. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) ("a right of reply" statute creating a misdemeanor viola-
tion for a newspaper's refusal to afford political candidates equal space to answer
criticism and attacks on their record held violative of first amendment's guarantee
of a free press). See also note 6, supra.
97. "ANPA claims we are attempting to inhibit a newspaper owners' [sic]
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argued that this first amendment consideration precluded the adop-
tion of a multiple ownership rule which required divestiture of exist-
ing cross-owned combinations and which precluded the issuance of
a license if cross-ownership would result. 8
This argument is essentially a first amendment domino theory.
Governmental inroads on press freedom occur as a result of exten-
sive regulation; increasing that regulation tends to breed further
inroads. Not only is this true as an abstract proposition, runs the
argument, but it is particularly true where such an extension is
unwarranted. To support the contention that the increasing regula-
tion is unwarranted, the industry argued that the mass media do not
have the all-encompassing influence popularly ascribed to them, "
and that adequate diversity already exists.'0 In short, even if the
extension of governmental regulation did not in fact lead to in-
creased governmental intrusion, such an unwarranted extension
could only result in an overall "chill" which could effectively inhibit
the media.'0 '
freedom to publish by preventing him from having an interest in broadcast sta-
tions." Multiole Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1050. The Commission,
however, correctly observed that the courts consistently have upheld its power to
regulate ownership pursuant to its public interest mandate. Id. at 1049-50. See
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) (upholding Commis-
sion's authority to promulgate regulations limiting one person to ownership of 5
VHF television stations, 7 AM, and 7 FM radio stations); Iacopi v. F.C.C., 451 F.2d
1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 1971) (deferring to Commission's determination that network
divestiture of cable television would increase competition and foster independent
sources of television programming); General Telephone Co. v. United States, 449
F.2d (5th Cir. 1971) (upholding Commission's rule prohibiting telephone compa-
nies from owning cable systems in their service areas).
The opponent's argument was further undercut by the fact that the Commission
"grandfathered" all cross-ownership combinations except in a few egregious cases.
This was not prohibition of broadcast station ownership by newspapers. Multiple
Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1050.
98. This contention of ANPA and NAB treated both newspapers and broadcast-
ing as part of the press protected by the first amendment. Compare id. at 1050 with
id. at 1071. See also notes 10, 11 & accompanying text supra.
99. See G. LiTwIN & W. WRoTH, Tim EFFECrs OF COMMON OWNERSHIP ON MEDIA
CONTENT AND INFLUENCE 1-1 (1969). This study was prepared for NAB. See also
Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1073-74.
100. See Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1071. The opponents
further asserted that there had been a long-term trend of increased diversity. See
id. at 1060-61.
101. See id. at 1071. Moreover, NAB and other parties argued that the proposed
rule was of a magnitude unprecedented in the history of any governmental agency,
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Cross-ownership, moreover, was actually advanced as a source of
diversity on two grounds. Since commonly owned media have larger
news staffs, they function more independently and are less reliant
on wire services and networks for news than singly owned media.1
2
Furthermore, absent cross-ownership, some outlets could be finan-
cially unable to sustain operations. 10 3 Destruction of cross-ownership
thus would be counter-productive to diversity policy.
In response to the Justice Department's antitrust argument, NAB
contended that freedom of the press outweighs the dangers of eco-
nomic concentration, and that mere economic concentration is not
necessarily a violation of the antitrust laws. ' In any event, they
argued, the Commission's major responsibility is to implement com-
munications policy rather than economic policy; economic consider-
ations should be secondary.' °5
B. The Economic Position Favoring Diversity
At the other end of the spectrum, the Justice Department advo-
particularly since it was not based on a violation of the law nor was it promulgated
pursuant to an express statutory authorization. See id. at 1070.
102. See G. LITWIN & W. WROTH, THE EFFECTS OF COMMON OWNERSHIP ON MEDIA
CONTENT AND INFLUENCE 5-1 (1969). Two related arguments were 1) that profession-
alism in journalism transcended employee-employer loyalties and resulted in inde-
pendent staffs; and 2) that the Fairness Doctrine, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. 11. 1972),
ensured that stations would not present only one viewpoint. See Multiple
Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1059-61. Commissioner Robinson, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part, observed in response to this second argument
that "[i]t is odd, to say the least, to hear from an industry that has often stated
its dislike for (and active opposition to) the Fairness Doctrine that we may rely on
that doctrine to ensure diversity." Id., 50 F.C.C.2d at 1119 n.13 (Robinson,
Comm'r, separate opinion).
103. Other economic hardship arguments were that "needed capital" as well as
"fresh talent and creativity" would be driven away by the imposition of another
burden on the broadcast industry and that the value of both newspapers and
television stations would decline. See Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50
F.C.C.2d at 1067-68.
104. See G. LITWIN & W. WROTH, THE EFFEcrs OF COMMON OWNERSHIP ON MEDIA
CONTENT AND INFLUENCE 6-12,-14 (1969).
105. The Commission, while arguing that the multiple ownership rules rested on
the "twin goals of diversity of viewpoints and economic competition," in fact
weighed the diversity aspect of communications policy more heavily than the eco-
nomic competition aspect. See Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at
1074, 1079-81. But the Commission's acceptance of the diversity aspect of the first
amendment as primary failed to give adequate consideration to the other first
amendment requirement-that the press be free from governmental intrusion. See
notes 116-21 & accompanying text infra.
1975]
1238 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cated divestiture of cross-owned media and prohibition of future
cross-ownership licensing. Its reasoning was based largely on the
assertion that economic competition would bring about diversity of
ideas. The advertising market was utilized as the yardstick for com-
petition.' 6 The major premise of the economic position is that tele-
vision and newspapers are the most important local advertising cen-
ters and therefore the most commercially important media.' 7 Cross-
ownership in this context leads to a monopoly of the local advertis-
ing market that results in a monopolization of the dissemination of
local news. '
The economic position, therefore, concluded that there is suffi-
cient interchangeability (cross-elasticity) of demand between news-
paper and television advertising to justify divestiture of cross-owned
stations. The premise of cross-elasticity of demand for advertising
presents the crux of the economic position' 09-that the elimination
of economic competition between cross-owned newspapers and tele-
vision stations will ultimately result in a reduction in the competi-
tion of ideas. The more highly concentrated this combined advertis-
ing market, the more likely it is that there will be a reduction of
competition for advertising. The Justice Department further argued
that this lessening of competition might also result in higher adver-
tising costs and hence ultimately higher consumer costs."0 Divesti-
106. "Newspaper and television advertising is, truly, the 'lubricant of com-
merce.'" DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS ON FCC DOCKET No.
18110, at 4 (May 15, 1974) [hereinafter cited as DOJ COMMENTS].
107. See id. at 5.
108. As the Commission noted:
Daily newspapers tend to be much larger enterprises than television stations.
Radio stations are significantly smaller than either. . . . The Department of
Justice points to a Roper study that indicated that the public principally
relied on newspapers and television stations for their news. On this basis they
would give little weight to other media sources.
Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1057.
109. Compare id. at 1056, with id. at 1122-23 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring
in part & dissenting in part). Interchangeability or "line of commerce" precedents,
however, are far from clear. Compare United States v. Continental Can Co., 378
U.S. 441 (1964) (glass and metal containers held a single line of commerce) with
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (copper and
aluminum conductors held not a single line of commerce).
110. See Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1057-58. See also
J. Rose, Credible and Incredible Evidence, Stanford Research Center in Economic
Growth, Memorandum No. 109 (1971); Lago, The Price Effects of Joint Mass
Communication Media Ownership, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 789 (1971).
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ture and refusal to grant future licenses were therefore justified to
prevent undue concentration of the media.
The key difficulty in applying economic principles to broadcast-
newspaper cross-ownership lies in determining the relevant eco-
nomic market. The Justice Department urged that the "relevant
market" in terms of advertising be defined as "those media which
(1) can realistically be considered as outlets for the expression of
views for local issues and (2) can realistically be viewed as sellers of
advertising to local advertisers.""' A simple comparison of the num-
ber of commonly owned media to the total number of publications
would be inadequate because all sellers or voices are not equal; thus,
the Commission should look to each seller's share of market reve-
nue." 2 The Justice Department, however, realized that the FCC
could not easily undertake an extensive "relevant market share"
economic analysis and therefore recommended that a Grade B con-
tour of airwave overlap be used to determine the relevant market."
3
The other problem involved in applying economic principles to
the cross-ownership issue lies in the Commission's jurisdiction to
enforce and apply the principles of the antitrust laws. While it is
well-established that the FCC cannot enforce the antitrust laws
directly,"' the Justice Department argued that the principles of
antitrust law should be applied as indicative of undue media con-
centration, and that the Commission should be required by its pub-
lic interest mandate to promote economic competition as a means
of increasing diversity. 115 Since newspapers are subject to antitrust
regulation"' and the Commission has the power to regulate owner-
ship pursuant to the public interest standard,"17 the Justice Depart-
ment argued for "dissolution of [all] existing co-located daily
newspaper-television station combinations within a reasonable pe-
riod of time.""'
111. DOJ COMMENTS, supra note 102, at 2.
112. See id. at 22-23, citing United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S.
350 (1970); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363-65 (1963).
113. DOJ COMMENTS, supra note 102, at 25-26.
114. See United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
115. See Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1059.
116. The Supreme Court early stated that the press in its commercial aspect is
subject to the Sherman Act. Indiana Farmer's Guide Co. v. Prairie Co., 293 U.S.
268 (1934).
117. See note 35 supra.
118. DOJ COMMENTS, supra note 102, at 21.
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This recommendation presumes that cross-ownership per se re-
sults in a lack of competition leading to inadequate diversity and
that only varied ownership will achieve a competitive market pro-
moting diverse views. This economic approach, however, presents
only one aspect of the public interest standard.' 9 It ignores the
importance of the first amendment's prohibiton of undue govern-
mental regulation in much the same way that NAB's and ANPA's
argument based on that prohibition ignores the first amendment's
command to promote diversity.
C. A First Amendment Balancing Position
The Justice Department and the broadcast industry thus utilize
differing approaches to further their conflicting interpretations of
first amendment goals-promotion of diverse viewpoints and free-
dom from undue governmental interference. This conflict is not
irreconcilable; preferably, these policies may be balanced.'2 0
119. "In short, the antitrust laws are merely another tool which a regulatory
agency employs to a greater or lesser degree to give understandable content to the
broad statutory concept of the 'public interest.'" Northern Natural Gas Co. v.
FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 960-61 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (citation omitted).
120. CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY, ARGUMENTS ON :FCC DOCKET No.
18110 at 217-225 (July 24, 1974). At the oral argument the Center for Governmen-
tal Responsibility submitted the following as a proposed amendment to 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.636 (1973):
73.636 Multiple Ownership
(a) No license for a television broadcast station shall be granted or renewed
to any party (including all parties under common control if):
(3) Such party owns or controls directly or indirectly, through separate or
subsidiary corporations or otherwise, one or more daily newspaper publica-
tions as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1802(4) (1970) which operates in the relevant
market unless:
(a) there is one or more daily newspaper or broadcast stations in the rele-
vant market under different ownership and with market strength relatively
equal to or greater than the existing daily newspaper or television broadcast
outlet or proposed television broadcast outlet of the party seeking licensing;
(b) there is no challenge to the existing license or there is only one appli-
cant for a license;
(c) there is a finding of fact that a challenger cannot continue to indepen-
dently operate a broadcast outlet.
(4) The divestiture of facilities required by section (3) shall be accom-
plished not later than the first license renewal date of such station following
five (5) years from the effective date of section (3).
This proposed amendment would have precluded cross-ownership where licens-
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The impact of concentrated ownership on diversity of ideas,
rather than economic competition, should be the primary policy
concern in licensing.' 2 On the other hand, the broadcast media is
not freed from regulation by the first amendment, 22 particularly in
cross-ownership situations where great potential exists for restrict-
ing the number of viewpoints presented to the community.' 23 The
diversity policy of the first amendment thus requires the Commis-
sion to take some affirmative steps to reduce potentially harmful
concentrations of media ownership.
A balancing approach suggests that in markets where sufficient
inter-media competition exists cross-ownership should not be pro-
hibited. Many larger cities have all three major television networks,
some non-affiliated stations, many radio stations, and several daily
newspapers. Except hypothetically where they are all cross-owned
by the same party, at least two parties still compete for advertising
and create the possibility for diversity of ideas. In such large mar-
kets, then, the Commission should be obligated to follow the first
amendment policy of minimal regulation since diversity already
exists. Only in the smaller markets where all broadcast facilities and
newspapers are owned by one party would the concentration be
sufficiently egregious for the Commission to require divestiture or
prohibit licensing.
Even in those situations, the balancing approach requires certain
caveats. No divestiture should be required should the present owner
be unable to sell the broadcast facility at a fair price or if the com-
munity be financially unable to support a separate broadcast facil-
ity and newspaper. Parties excepted under these caveats would be
subject to future divestiture if market conditions changed. This
balancing approach prevents the over-regulation that would result
were all or a majority of the cross-owned stations forced to divest
with no consideration of existing diversity.
The same rationale applies to future licensing. If a modicum of
competition exists, cross-ownership should be allowed. Only in a
case where the local dissemination of news might be monopolized
should the duopoly rules require a per se denial of a license. Mere
ing resulted in ownership of the only television and only daily newspaper by the
same party in the relevant market. The proposal would not have prohibited cross-
ownership if there were a competing newspaper or television station to provide a
divergent source of information to the community.
121. See notes 18-28 & accompanying text supra.
122. See notes 36 & 116 & accompanying text supra.
123. See notes 32-35 & accompanying text supra.
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cross-ownership, without more, does not justify an absolute prohibi-
tion of licensing where some substantial media competition exists.
Whenever cross-ownership does in fact contravene the public inter-
est the Commission should deny renewal or refuse licensing. The
Commission should, however, be more explicit as to precisely which
practices it would consider harmful to the public interest to avoid
industry uncertainty. 2 4
This balancing position would implement first amendment diver-
sity policy while at the same time minimizing interference with the
industry. Thus, while promoting competition this position would
give effect to both first amendment policies.
IV. DOCKET 18110: THE COMMISSION'S NEW RULE
On January 28, 1975 the Commission terminated Docket 18110 by
amending the Commission's existing multiple ownership regula-
tions, in particular the duopoly rules.'25 The new rules incorporate
newspaper ownership as an additional trigger to the operation of
these rules.' 26
The new rules prohibit the acquisition by a daily newspaper' 27 of
a television or radio station, the specified contours of which encom-
pass the community in which the newspaper is circulated.'2 Mere
ownership or control, direct or indirect, of a daily newspaper thus
will be sufficient to preclude a party's acquisition of a broadcast
124. One of the major concerns throughout the proceeding was with industry
stability. The high cost of investing in a broadcast facility was thought to be
prohibitive unless there were some assurances that challenges could not be made
frivolously and that the Commission would not extend its regulatory scheme so as
to impose serious burdens. See, e.g., Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d
at 1066-68.
125. Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1046. The "7-7-7" rule
remained the same. See id. at 1076 & App.F at 1099. The Commission continues
to feel that splitting AM-FM radio combinations would cause too great a disruption
in the broadcast industry and remove necessary support from new stations. It
consequently has not prohibited these combinations. See id. at 1054-55. But it
reached the opposite conclusion with respect to newspaper support of broadcast
outlets.
126. Id. at 1076.
127. Note 10 to each amendment defines a "daily newspaper" as "one which is
published four or more days per week, which is in the English language, and which
is circulated generally in the community of publication." The note excludes college
newspapers from this definition. Id., App.F at 1101, 1103, 1106.
128. Id., App.F at 1099, 1101, 1104, amending 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(a),
73.240(a)(1), 73.636(a)(1).
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license in the same market. The rules require, moreover, that a
broadcast licensee which acquires such a daily newspaper dispose
of its broadcast station within one year or by the time of its next
license renewal date, whichever is longer.'
In addition, while most existing cross-owned media combinations
will be unaffected,"' a few combinations, controlling the only broad-
cast facility (AM or FM radio station or television station) and the
only daily newspaper in the same area as of January 1, 1975, are
required to sell one of the media by 1980.131 The impact of the
divestiture requirement on existing licenses is therefore narrower in
scope than the impact of the rules on future efforts to achieve cross-
ownership. The prohibition on future cross-ownership is absolute,
while divestiture was limited to a few cases of "literal" monopoly
in relatively small markets. Even where divestiture was ordered,
furthermore, the Commission provided for a waiver under certain
circumstances.1 2 It is necessary, however, to note that existing com-
binations will be subject to the new rules if they attempt to sell their
combinations; 33 a purchaser cannot acquire a cross-owned combi-
nation in contravention of the new rules even though a current
owner could continue to hold it.
The approach taken by the Commission results in a per se rejec-
tion of future cross-ownership to promote competition, in contrast
to the previous ad hoc approach. Opponents say the new position is
"competition for competition's sake."'34 Commissioner Robinson
called this sort of regulation a "structural" approach, one which
"looks toward promoting a market conformation hospitable to di-
versity and competition," while a "behavioral approach relies on
regulatory standards to enforce norms of competitive conduct. 1 3' As
Commissioner Hooks pointed out, nothing evil had previously been
presumed from cross-ownership 136 but, whether evil or not, the Com-
129. Id. at 1076 & n.25. The Commission hereby adopted the rule it had proposed
in its Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.2d 339, 346 (1970).
130. Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1080-81.
131. Id. at 1084, App.F at 1099, 1101-02, 1104. This result was accomplished
by an addition to each of the multiple ownership sections: 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(c),
73.240(c), 73.636(c).
132. Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1085. See notes 150-155
& accompanying text infra.
133. Id. App.F at 1100-01, 1102-03, 1105 (note 8 to each amended section).
134. See id. at 1114-16 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part & dissenting in
part).
135. Id. at 1117 n.12.
136. Id. at 1109 (Hooks, Comm'r, concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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mission has now concluded that certain combinations violate the
public interest standard.
As the Commission stated in its conclusion: "The multiple owner-
ship rules rest on two foundations: the twin goals of diversity of
viewpoints and economic competition." ' Using these goals to em-
phasize diversity in the new rule, the Commission thus rejected the
arguments of NAB and ANPA that adequate local diversity in
media ownership currently exists. The actual impact on current
ownership, however, appears minimal in larger markets. The Com-
mission's order will affect only seven television stations'38 and a
slightly greater number of radio stations'39 over the next five years,
and some of those may well escape divestiture through the waiver
provisions.'4 °
A. First Amendment Diversity Policy in the Commission's Order
While the Commission generally recognized the need for restraint
in extending its regulation of the media, the basic thrust of the
Order seems to be that "this country can ill afford a monopoly on
the expression of views of issues of local concern."' 4' First amend-
ment diversity policy dominated the Order. All traditional cases
supporting the policy for diversity of viewpoints were cited. 4 ' The
divestiture requirements may be subject to waiver, but even the
waiver exceptions emphasize the necessity for sustaining diver-
sity.' 3 The Order noted that all the participants agreed upon the
desirability of diversity; the differences between them arose either
from differing views on whether adequate diversity presently existed
or on the best approach to obtaining satisfactory diversity.
The Commission insisted that its new policy varied from the Jus-
tice Department's economic approach when it stated that the Jus-
tice Department
place[s] a greater emphasis on public policies underlying the need
to preserve competition than on diversity aspects and for their argu-
137. Id. at 1074.
138. Id., App.D at 1098.
139. Id., App.E at 1098.
140. "Five years from now, I think we may find that no divestitures at all have
taken place." Id. at 1127 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part & dissenting in
part). See notes 150-155 & accompanying text infra.
141. Id. at 1083.
142. See, e.g., id. at 1048-49, 1050.
143. See id. at 1085-86.
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ments they use analytic tools taken from economic studies of market
share and the like. Conversely, the diversity approach would examine
the number of voices available to the people of a given area. The
premise is that a democratic society cannot function without the
clash of divergent views. It is clear to us that the idea of diversity of
viewpoints from antagonistic sources is at the heart of the Commis-
sion's licensing responsibility.'44
What seems to be missing from the Commission's order, however,
is a serious consideration of the need to minimize governmental
regulation. For example, while cases relating to restraint were cited
in his opinion, when Commissioner Robinson argued for the first
amendment policy favoring diversity he stated:
According to this argument, the First Amendment would be offended
by a rule that "discriminates" against the owners of newspapers-
i.e., that prohibited to newspaper owners a right permitted to other
orderly citizens-the right to be a Commission licensee.
The short answer to this submission is that it is not newspaper
owners that are being aimed at-it is monopolies or oligopolies: and
these the First Amendment does not protect. Indeed, it may be
argued that the First Amendment itself is against the creation and
subsistence of such strong redoubts of economic and social power.'4 5
Resolving the cross-ownership problem by linking it only to the
first amendment's mandate of diversity fails to weigh adequately
the consideration of keeping governmental regulation at a mini-
mum. While a statement as sweeping as Commissioner Robinson's
could be aimed at many economic entities, economic classifications
and analyses in and of themselves do not resolve the first amend-
ment problems of promoting diversity and minimizing governmen-
tal interference with the media.
B. Economic Considerations
The Commission recognized that it lacks jurisdiction to enforce
the antitrust laws and that it need not consider economic concentra-
tion as a factor absent a showing of abuse.'46 In fact, the Commission
observed that it could only view undue concentration as a possibile
violation of the public interest standard in licensing proceedings.'
4 7
144. Id. at 1079 (footnote omitted).
145. Id. at 1118-19 (citation omitted).
146. See id. at 1078-79, 1088-89.
147. Id. at 1078-79.
1975]
1246 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The Commission thereby recognized the distinction between anti-
trust and first amendment types of diversity:
[W]e have analyzed the basic media ownership questions in terms
of this agency's primary concern-diversity in ownership as a means
of enhancing diversity in programming service to the public-rather
than in terms of a strictly antitrust approach.4 8
However, the Order also evinced a concern that the two "goals of
diversity and competition" might produce an unwanted result
where forcing diversity would result in the loss of all stations to a
given section of the public. "9
The major economic considerations in the antitrust argument
dealt with the monopolization of the relevant product mar-
ket-advertising-and the definition of the relevant geographic
market-the area in which cross-ownership would be considered
monopolistic. 5 These considerations will be relevant in future li-
censing proceedings, and the Commission will examine allegations
of economic monopolies which might warrant action under the Sher-
man Act on an ad hoc basis in those remaining circumstances where
monopolization arguments might still be raised. 5' Furthermore, in
renewal proceedings for co-owned stations which are not divested,
antitrust considerations will constitute a valid basis for further
hearings if economic monopolization might warrant action under
the Sherman Act. 5 -
While economic analysis was contained in the Commission's
Order, it is clear that the new duopoly rules were not based primar-
ily on that analysis. Furthermore, there was no indication that proof
of economic concentration would be necessary to invoke the new
cross-ownership prohibitions in future license proceedings. In fact,
it was made clear that the mere possibility of monopolization of
viewpoints inherent in a newspaper's proposed ownership of a
broadcast outlet by itself would be deemed sufficient to preclude
that ownership. Therefore, while economic theory may bolster the
148. Id. at 1079.
149. Id. at 1074. Commissioner Robinson, a proponent of more divestiture than
required by the Order, discussed at length the economic consequences of concentra-
tion and its relationship to diversity, but conceded that promotion of economic
diversity alone might not be a sufficient justification for Commission action. See
id. at 1116 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring in part & dissenting in part).
150. See notes 106-13 supra.
151. Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1080 n.29.
152. Id.
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Commission's conclusion and be an ad hoc factor in renewals, eco-
nomic analysis need play no part in future license proceedings when
the fact of potential cross-ownership is proved.
V. FUTURE OF CROSS-OWNERSHIP POLICY AFTER DOCKET 18110
Two pressing questions remain in the wake of the Commission's
Order: first, how will divestiture of the affected stations be adminis-
tered; and second, how will future comparative hearings treat the
issue of cross-ownership for those stations not compelled to divest?
The Commission recognized that "[d]ivestiture has a substan-
tial impact, and should be required only when we can determine
that it is required by the public interest. ' 153 In July of 1974, 79 co-
located newspaper-television combinations existed, of which seven
are now slated for divestiture. '54 No comparative hearings regarding
those co-owned stations which are being subjected to divestiture will
be held since such hearings would subject those stations to the
unfair burden of opposing challenges when they are slated to lose
their licenses anyway.1 55 Sympathy has been expressed by certain
Commissioners for those stations which have been required to di-
vest,'56 since the "[divestiture] rules are not in the least premised
on the existence of improprieties in the operations of the media
holdings. 1' 57 Thus, careful scrutiny can be expected on the waiver
requests which undoubtedly will be submitted. Additionally, the
Commission recognized that if in a given case divestiture would in
fact operate contrary to the major thrust of its Order and actually
reduce diversity of viewpoints, then it should be applied in that
case.' 5 Four specific conditions for waiver were established: 1) total
inability to sell the station; 2) inability to sell at a fair price; 3)
financial inability of the community to support separate ownership
and operation of the newspaper and television station; and 4) dis-
service to the public interest.1 51
As a specific example of waiver, the Commission recognized that
not all instances in which the only daily newspaper owned the only
153. Id.
154. See id. at 1080 n.29 & App. D at 1098.
155. Id. at 1088-89.
156. Id. at 1108 (Reid, Comm'r, concurring), 1112-13 (Washburn, Comm'r,
concurring).
157. Id. at 1085.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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local radio or television station were "true monopoly situations."'"
For example, although only one station might be licensed in a city
-such as in Norfolk, Virginia-stations licensed in other nearby
cities might also be considered local when they respond to that
community's problems. In Norfolk's case it was said that true diver-
sity exists in fact. The presence of such bases for waiver makes it
likely that protracted proceedings will ensue over the divestiture of
the affected licensees; while results cannot be predicted, leniency
may well be the practice.'6 '
The future of existing co-owned stations not affected by divesti-
ture is still somewhat uncertain.' 2 The Commission stated that "the
weight to be given the factor of diversity in comparative renewal
hearings remains to be determined."'63 Commissioner Lee in his
concurring opinion stated:
[B]ased on my prior experience, the Commission should give little
weight to this issue in a comparative hearing against an existing TV
licensee. As the Commission stated (at paragraph 129) any overall
restructuring of the industry it deemed necessary has been done in
this docket. To permit restructuring at renewal time would permit to
be done indirectly what the Commission has refused to do directly."04
Commissioner Lee's interpretation, however, is subject to ques-
tion. In its conclusions, the Commission noted that it prefers that
commonly-owned stations avoid presenting a monolithic struc-
ture.'66 Paragraph 131 condemned monolithic cross-ownership, i.e.,
print and media outlets that are "mirror images of one another,
speaking with one voice.""'6 The Commission endorsed efforts by
commonly-owned media to ensure maximum competition by such
devices as "separate editorial and reportorial staff."' 6 Two Com-
missioners specifically discussed the desirability of separate staffs
in the continuing co-owned stations.'66 Apparently, operational sep-
160. Id. at 1081.
161. See notes 134 & 150 supra.
162. Uncertainty is further fostered by the diversity of opinions of the Commis-
sioners: Commissioners Lee, Reid, Washburn and Quello, concurring and issuing
statements; Commissioners Hooks and Robinson concurring in part & dissenting
in part and issuing statements.
163. Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1088.
164. Id. 50 F.C.C. 2d at 1107.
165. Id. at 1089.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1111-12 (Hooks, Comm'r, concurring in part & dissenting in part),
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aration will be an important factor in a cross-owned licensee's favor
in future comparative hearings.
VI. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE NEW RULE
The Commission's Order fails to address several issues. First, it
appears that while the Commission extensively employed the first
amendment policy of diversity, it omitted from its analysis and
Order the equally important first amendment policy of minimal
governmental regulation. While it appears that the Commission's
divestiture provisions adopt the proposed balancing approach, '69
insufficient consideration was given to the continuing policy of re-
straint contained in that same proposal. In fact, the Commission's
Order allows for larger intervention in future licensing procedures
than is actually necessary to ensure diversity. Future combinations
should not be excluded when other media outlets exist. The Com-
mission recognized the validity of this concept in its divestiture
provisions but not in its restrictions on future licensing.
Furthermore, the Commission has effectively "grandfathered" a
select number of co-owned stations. 7 ' While adequate diversity ac-
tually exists in these stations, they have nonetheless received spe-
cial treatment over future potential licensees who might wish to
enter a market with similarly sufficient competition. In such a situ-
ation, both the present and the potential licensee would exist in the
same climate of diversity. The new duopoly rules therefore discrimi-
nate against a readily ascertainable class of potential licensees.
The Commission's ruling, moreover, still appears to sustain un-
certainty as to various classes of ownership. Those seeking future
licenses, of course, can rely upon the fact that they cannot acquire
additional licenses in the same market. However, all current owners
of co-owned stations are existing in a state of limbo. Those stations
slated for divestiture remain uncertain as to how the waiver provi-
sions will be interpreted. Similarly, co-owned stations not subjected
to the divestiture provisions may expect future challenges relating
to the fact of their co-owned status-especially if they have not
adhered to the Commission's guidelines concerning separation of
operations. Predictability and stability would be increased if the
Commission formalized these guidelines in such a manner that co-
1112 (statement of Comm'r Quelo).
169. See notes 120-24 & accompanying text supra.
170. Multiple Ownership, supra note 2, 50 F.C.C.2d at 1050, 1080-86.
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owned stations could act accordingly.' 71
One crucial aspect of licensing policy considered during oral argu-
ments and throughout the pendency of Docket 18110 was not ad-
dressed in the final Order. No reference was made to the establish-
ment of different types of ownership than currently exist. Commis-
sioner Hooks pointed out that the order in no way directly promotes
new or minority types of ownership and asserted that the Commis-
sion should have addressed itself more directly to the qualifications
of new station owners to assure real diversity in the form of media
ownership by minority groups.' Increased minority ownership is an
important consideration in diversity policy; a systematic search for
diverse ideas must particularly encourage minority views.
VII. CONCLUSION
Promoting the dissemination of diverse ideas with a minimum of
governmental interference is the goal of the first amendment in
protecting free press and free media. This goal is implicit in the
public interest mandate of the Communications Act of 1934. A pre-
cise balance between restraint and diversity in first amendment
policy appears impossible, but the process of decision should reflect
both, with deference to restraint where possible. The Commission's
Order in Docket 18110 failed to strike such a balance; any future
action regarding cross-ownership would benefit by an increased rec-
ognition of the importance of restraint.
171. Uncertainty is furthered by the fact that the Commission is conducting a
rulemaking proceeding to determine the importance of diversification as a factor
in a comparative renewal hearing. See Further Notice of Inquiry in Docket No.
19154, 31 F.C.C.2d 443 (1971). This proceeding was necessitated by Citizens
Comm. Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which struck down the
Commission's 1970 Policy Statement, supra note 70. See Multiple Ownership,
supra note 2, at 1087-89. Pending resolution of this issue in the rulemaking pro-
ceeding, the Commission views it solely as a matter of its discretion:
In the light of Citizens Communications Center, whatever policy is developed
will take into account diversification as a factor that must be considered in
a comparative renewal hearing. Also in the light of that case, the weighing
of factors lies within the substantive discretion of the Commission, and the
weight to be given the factor of diversity in comparative renewal hearings
remains to be determined. Until such time as a new policy is formulated in
Docket No. 19154, of necessity, under Citizens Communications Center, the
factor of diversification must be considered in comparative renewal hearings,
but the weight to be given that factor will be a matter within the discretion
of the Commission.
Id. at 1088.
172. Id. at 1111 (Hooks, Comm'r, concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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